Recently, however, the System has drawn back from rigid adherence to aggregate targeting, broadening its target ranges and allowing a wider variety of considerations to influence the conduct of policy. While interest rates have not been explicitly targeted, the System has adopted operating procedures which give it tighter control over rates, and has intervened on more than one occasion to change their average levels. 1
The devices according to which the System has attempted to influence interest rates have varied greatly over time. Initially the discount rate was simply set at the target rate, and the Reserve Banks lent (discounted) relatively freely at that rate. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, and particularly with the outbreak of the Second World War, the System shifted to a policy of influencing rates indirectly through open market operations.
Another outgrowth of the Depression was acquisition by the System of the authority to set and vary the required reserve ratio imposed on member banks. During 1936 During -1937 the System used this authority in dramatic fashion, doubling required reserve ratios in a series of steps in an attempt to absorb and sterilize the large excess reserves then held by member banks.~Thisaction was followed immediately by, and is widely believed to have precipitated, the sharp recession of 1937~1938.2 Since this episode the System has adjusted reserve ratios infrequently, and has not used changes in the ratio as a shortor intermediate-term tool of policy.
During the 1950s the reluctance of the System to vary the reserve ratio countercyclically, and in particular its tendency to reduce the ratio from time to time without subsequently increasing it, attracted some criticism from Congress. Kareken (1961) argued that that the justifications offered by the System in defense ofthis behavior did not stand up under careful scrutiny.
He did not, however, attempt to provide a positive rationale for a more active * policy with regard to ratio changes.
One of the reasons the System has avoided frequent reserve ratio changes has undoubtedly been the desire to avoid a repetition of events like those of of 1936 -1938 . Prior to 1980 , another source of restraint was the desire to prevent the financial burden of reserve ratio maintenance from driving member banks out of the System. 3 This danger existed because the reserve ratios imposed by state banking agencies were typically lower and less variable~than those imposed by the System. A related source of restraint has been the use of lagged reserve accounting, which reduces the short-run effectiveness of policy interventions which rely directly or indirectly on the required reserve * Kareken observed (p. 65) that "the economic effects produced by a change in reserve ratios differ significantly from those produced by an equivalent open market operation," but did not elaborate. He devoted the bulk of his paper to arguing that "official reasons for making day-to-day adjustments in member banks' reserve positions by means of open market sales and purchases will not standup under close scrutiny, and the same can be said of the post-Accord record on reserve ratios." His analysis included an attack on what remain the most frequently-cited reasons for the failure of the Federal Reserve System to use the required reserve ratio as an active policy instrument --that significant changes in the ratio have large, discontinuous effects, and that frequent small changes would unduly complicate banks' reserve management problem. ratio. The shift to lagged accounting, which occurred in 1968, was designed to reduce member banks' costs of compliance with System reserve requirements. 4
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 gave the Federal Reserve System power to set required reserve ratios for a broader range of transactions accounts, and for all depository institutions. In addition, in 1984 the System returned to contemporaneous reserve accounting. These legislative and regulatory changes have created conditions under which the required reserve ratio could acquire a more active role as an instrument of monetary policy. 5
Until recently, academic analyses of monetary policy have paid scant attention to role of Federal Reserve base money creation in helping finance federal government budget deficits. Since reserve requirememts are an important source of demand for base money, this omission may detract substantially from our understanding of both the economic impact of changes in reserve ratios and the formulation of policy regarding reserve requirements. Goodfriend and Ilargraves (1983) One of the reasons the financing implications of reserve requirement policy have so often been ignored is that models capable of describing them convincingly have not been available. The development of dynamic general equilibrium monetary models has gone far towards solving this problem. In recent years authors such as Wallace (1984) , Romer (1985) , and Freeman (1987) have used different specifications of the overlapping generations model to examine the interrelationships between the required reserve ratio, other monetary policy instruments, government budget deficits, and the levels of endogenous real and nominal variables. 6
The purpose of our paper is to examine the implications of use of the required reserve ratio as an active policy instrument in a model in which (1) monetary policy decisions are constrained by the requirements of deficit finance and (2) the monetary authority targets interest rates. In particular, we are interested in contrasting the effects of changes in the required reserve ratio with those of open market purchases or sales which achieve the same rate targets.
Our analysis is conducted in the context of stylized policy situations (initial settings, problems, and goals) which we view as analogous to actual situations frequently confronted by the Federal Reserve System. We assume that the initial level of real (or nominal) interest rates is viewed by the monetary authorities as "too high," and that they consequently select a lower target. We assume that the authorities can choose between two policy instruments: the required reserve ratio, which can be changed directly, and the ratio of nominal bonds to nominal money, which can be changed through open market operations. (We do not examine policy experiments involving changes in both instruments.) Finally, we assume that the authority seeks the instrument which will permit the target interest rate to be achieved at the lowest rate * of inflation.
*
We make this assumption because it seems clear that the System continues to regard a higher rate of inflation as the principal "cost" of policy interventions designed to reduce market interest rates (and vice-versa interested in giving "advice" (of an admittedly abstract sort) to the System, we confine ourselves to studying circumstances under which this is the case.
(We refer to these circumstances as those in which the "conventional wisdom" holds true.) We conclude the introduction to this paper with a brief discussion of the empirical plausibility of these circumstances.
In his 1984 paper Wallace shows that in a stationary economy, a sufficient condition for "perverse" results is that the real interest rate on government bonds exceeds the real growth rate of the economy. 7 The logic behind this result is quite simple. In Wallace's model the entire real deficit is "pure" in the sense of being uncovered by future surpluses. As a result, in equilibrium the real deficit must be covered by a combination of currency and bond seigniorage. When real interest rates exceed real growth rates, bond seigniorage is negative. An increase in the ratio of bonds to money (an open market sale) increases the losses on bond seigniorage, and thus forces an increase in currency seigniorage --which is to say a higher rate of inflation.
At the time Wallace was writing the U.S. was in the midst of a lengthy period during which real interest rates almost certainly exceeded real growth rates. Darby (1984) , commenting on a earlier (1981) paper by Sargent and
Wallace which obtained similarly "perverse" results, shows that historically this inequality has typically been reversed. During the years since Wallace wrote the relationship between these variables has been much closer to historical form: the real growth rate exceeded the real interest rate for four of the six years beginning in 1984, and the average growth rate for this period exceeded the average real interest rate by approximately one half of one percent. 8 Thus both trend and historical experience suggest that if we have not already returned to a situation of the sort necessary for the conventional wisdom to hold, we may soon do so.
Real growth rates in excess of real interest rates are not sufficient for the conventional wisdom, however. Under the assumptions described in the next section the conventional wisdom will hold whenever a decrease in the bond/currency ratio reduces total revenue from bond seigniorage. Now a decrease in the ratio reduces the real value of bonds, which tends to reduce bond seigniorage revenue; it also reduces the real interest rate on bonds, which has the opposite tendency. When the latter effect dominates, as is often the case, an open market purchase permits a reduction in currency * seigniorage revenues, which is to say a lower inflation rate.
It turns out that under the aforementioned assumptions the initial bond/currency ratio must be relatively low for the conventional wisdom to hold. This is true in part because low bond/currency ratios tend to be associated with low real interest rates, and in part because when the initial volume of bonds is low the negative effect on bond seigniorage of a reduction in bond volume is more easily offset by the positive effect of higher unit revenues.
Our analytical need for a low bond/currency ratio creates a potential conflict with the empirical facts concerning the ratio. At the time Wallace was writing its value for the U.S. was on the order of 7; it has since * The assumption that gross saving is fixed, so that real currency balances are a positive multiple of the required reserve ratio, is critical to the simplictiy of the analysis just presented. Were gross saving increasing in the real interest rate (for example) an open market purchase might, by reducing gross saving, reduce real currency balances as well as the real volume of bonds. This would make a perverse inflation response less likely.
increased, and now approaches b. 9 In simple specifications of the type presented in the text of the paper, ratios such as these are far too high to support the conventional wisdom, given plausible initial values for the real interest rate and the inflation rate. Fortunately, we have recently succeeded in constructing specifications of a slightly more general type for which the conventional wisdom holds at bonds/currency ratios consistent with the empirical values just cited, as well as plausible initial real interest and inflation rates. One specification of this type is described in the appendix to this paper.
II. The Model
As noted above, our model is borrowed from Wallace (1984) . At each discrete date t 1a total of N two-period lived agents (the members of generation t) are born. The preferences of each of these agents are representable by the utility function U(c 1 (t),c 2 (t+1)), where c~ (t) represents the amount of the single consumption good consumed at date t. We assume that U(.,) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly quasiconcave, and strictly increasing in each argument. We also assume that it satisfies the "Inada conditions"
The members of generation 0 (the "initial old") simply maximize their consumption of date 1 good.
Each generation t 1includes two groups of agents: savers and borrowers.
These agents receive intertemporal endowments (w~(t),w~ ( w'(t+b)
where Rb(t) will henceforth be denoted R(t), and R 5 (t) will be denoted Rd(t).
Borrowers' aggregate savings function is D(R(t)) = N[w~(t)-c~(R(t))]; we require D(R(t)) < 0 for relevant values of R(t). Savers' aggregate savings
function is S(Ra(t)) = N[w~(t)-c~(Rd(t))]; we assume S(R(t)) > 0 for R(t) > 0 . The c~(R~(t)) represent optimal levels of first period consumption for agents endowed (w~(t),w~(t+b)) and confronted by interest rates
The government must finance a real deficit of G at each date t b. It may do so by issuing fiat currency in the amount 11(t) or bonds in the amount B(t).
Bonds issued at date t are payable in fiat currency at date t+1; B(t)
represents the face value at date t+b of the bonds issued at date t. Let p(t)
represent the price of a unit of fiat currency in units of the consumption good at date t, and Pb(t) the date t price, in units of fiat currency, of a bond with a face value of one unit of fiat currency. The government's budget constraint is then given by
The initial quantities 11(0) and B(0) constitute the aggregate endowment of the members of generation 0.
Any borrowing or lending which may occur in this economy is assumed to be intermediated by commercial banks which operate competitively and costlessly.
These banks are required to hold fiat currency reserves equal at minimum to a positive fraction A of their total liabilities (deposits). The banks lend to borrowers and/or the government at rate R(t), and borrow (accept deposits) from savers at rate Rd(t). Since the banks must earn zero profits, we have
as a condition of equilibrium, where Rm(t) Pj~~) . R~(t)is the (real) rate of return on fiat currency held from date t to date t+b. lb A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with a binding required reserve ratio consists of a positive constant A, and a set of nonnegative sequences for 11(t), B(t), R~(t),Rd(t), R(t), p(t), and Pb(t), for all t 1, which satisfy conditions (1) and (2), as well as
Condition (3) ensures that banks comply with the reserve requirement, and that there are no excess reserves. Condition (4) guarantees that the credit market clears --that the excess of private saving over private borrowing is absorbed by private purchases of bonds and fiat currency. Condition (5) ensures that government bonds and private securities are perfect substitutes for banks, and that nonbank agents do not choose to hold fiat currency.
Unfortunately, analysis of the general version of this model gets quite complicated. In order to simplify the analysis we make the following sets of additional assumptions:
Set 1: Regularity of savings behavior.
We assume that gross savings are fixed --invariant, in particular, to changes in the rate of return on deposits. That is, S(Rd) = S > 0 for all Rd > 0
In addition, we assume that the gross borrowing function D(R) satisfies D'(R) > 0 and D' '(R) < 0 for all R > 0 .
Set 2: Existence of a pure currency seigniorage (/3 = 0) equilibrium with a binding reserve ratio and a gross real interest rate less than unity.
We assume that the demand functions are specified, and the reserve ratio A selected, so that when /3 = 0 there exists a rate of return vector 1(A) = (R(A),R~(A)) which satisfies the binding reserve ratio equilibrium conditions as well as lt(A) < 1 . Stated differently, we assume that there
Notice that G < AS is an immediate implication of the second set of assumptions.
Assumption set #2 is fairly strong; it is easy to specify plausible demand functions, and values of A, so that R(A) > 1. It turns out, however, that in specifications of this type the "conventional wisdom" never holds.
One simple assumption which is sufficient (but~~jj necessary --see Example 1) to ensure that R(A) < 1 for at least some binding values of A is that the deficit G can be financed without reserve requirements: that is, that
Having made this assumption, define the "threshold" reserve ratio --the highest nonbinding ratio --by~!÷~*) , and define~S÷~ (1) ; t is the reserve ratio which generates R(A) = 1 . Since S+D(R ) < AS whenever A is binding, we must have G < AS , which in turn implies > 0 (see pp. 17-18 below).
Consequently~, and R(A) < 1 whenever A E (A,I)
In what follows we also confine our attention to stationary equilibria.
A stationary equilibrium can be defined as consisting of a positive constant A, and nonnegative values it, R~,R~,p 1 , PbB, and M which satisfy
where M = p(t)11(t) and B = p(t)B(t).
III. Open Market Operations
Define /3 =~I~3 . Following Wallace (1984) we view /3, the nominal bonds/currency ratio, as a policy instrument which can be varied through open market operations. We will assume henceforth that /3 0 Notice that (1') and (4') can now be rewritten
Given the definition of /3, conditions (3') and (5') are readily seen to imply it PbB = fiAS-~. This identity, along with condition (3'), allows us to rewrite conditions (1'') and (4'') as it (6) [l-A(1÷/3~!)]S + D(R) = 0 , and
In Sections III and IV we examine the properties of the functions R(fl,A) and R~(fi,A) which are implicitly defined by equations (6) and (7). We begin by applying the Implicit Function Theorem to verify the existence of these Equations (6) and (7) can now be differentiated in order to obtain the OR following expressions for and Equations (6) and (7) can be used to show that R(/3) = we need It may be helpful to begin by describing our "rate-pegging experiments"
in terms of discrete changes in policy instruments and interest rates.
Suppose we begin with a particular specification of the model, and a particular setting of the policy vector (/3,A); we will call the latter (71,X).
If X is binding at 73 this policy vector generates a unique real interest rate it R(73,X) , and a unique currency rate of return 1t~R~(lJ,X)
Now suppose the monetary authority attempts to reduce the real interest rate by reducing the bonds/currency ratio, holding the required reserve ratio fixed. In particular, suppose that the authority chooses /3 with 0 < /3 < 73
generating it R(fi,X) and Rm R~(fl,X) . We know that it < It ; under assumptions described in Proposition 1, we also know that R~< ItmS uppose instead that the authority attempts to achieve the same reduction in the real interest rate by holding the bonds/currency ratio fixed and reducing the required reserve ratio. That is, suppose there exists a binding reserve ratio A < t such that R(73,A) = it. We are interested in the relative magnitudes of R~(/3,X) R~and R~(73,A) R~.
Unfortunately, we know of no easy way to provide a general characterization of the results of discrete rate pegging experiments. We opt instead for an approach which does not (at least in the first instance) involve discrete changes, and allows us to use calculus techniques.
We begin by reinterpeting our model by treating the reai interest rate it as a parameter, along with the reserve ratio A, and treating the bonds/currency ratio /3 as an endogenous variable. We then compute the derivative of R~,the rate of return on currency, with respect to it --holding the reserve ratio A fixed. This derivative describes the inflationary implications of a marginal reduction in it engineered by a reduction in /3.
Next we reinterpret the model by treating R as a parameter, along with the bonds/currency ratio /3, and treating the required reserve ratio A as an endogenous variable. Again we compute the derivative of Rm with respect to it --this time holding~3fixed. The derivative in question describes the inflationary implications of a marginal reduction in it engineered by a reduction in A. Finally, we evaluate this derivative at the value of /3 associated with the initial levels of it and A from the previous experiment.
This choice of /3 ensures that each of the two experiments start at the same equilibrium position, and permits a fair comparison of the induced increases in the inflation rate.
A. Endogenization of~3
Notice that equilibrium conditions (1') and (3') imply G = AS(b_Rm) + PbB(b_R) . And since conditions (3') and (4') imply
This equation can be solved for Rm~yielding
AS OR Thus~~(R,A) > 0 whenever the conventional wisdom holds.
We can also use (3'), (4'), and (5') to obtain the equation 
Endogenization of A Equation (7) can be solved for Rm~yielding it~= AS~G 1~. This
AS [1 - expression for it~can be substituted into equation (6) , and the latter solved for A. This procedure yields
Substituting A(R,/3) into this expression generates
C. Derivative comparisons OR OR
We wish to compare the magnitudes of~~(it,A) and~~R,fi) . These derivatives describe the declines in the rate of return on currency associated with marginal declines in the real interest rate which are caused by reductions in the bonds/currency ratio or reductions in the required reserve ratio, respectively. Stated differently, we wish to determine the relative magnitudes of the inflation rate increases associated with attempts to use open market purchases, or reductions in the required reserve ratio, to peg interest rates at levels marginally lower than their current levels. When we do this we must ensure that each of the two rate-pegging experiments whose results are compared begins at the same equilibrium position; that is, that 
where as always PbB = (1-A)S + D(R)
Proposition 3 demonstrates that reducing the real interest rate by cutting the required reserve ratio is always more inflationary than reducing the rate through open market purchases.
Proposition 3. Assumption sets #1 and #2 imply~(R,A) < 0
Proof:
We have seen that
It can ultimately be shown that q~(R,A)~0 as
Since it > 0 , we know G > S+D(R) . Assumption set #1 gives us D'(R) > 0 and set #2 gives us AS > G . Consequently the left-hand-side term above is strictly negative. As the right hand-side-term is nonnegative, we havẽ (R,A)< 0
VI. Nominal Interest Rates
The direct observability of nominal interest rates makes them convenient short-run targets for monetary policy. 10 It seems therefore of interest to determine the effects of changes in /3 and A on the level of nominal interest rates, and to determine the effects on inflation rates and real interest rates of attempts to use changes in these parameters to reduce nominal rates.
We begin by confirming the existence of a function Rnom(fi~A) which links the nominal interest rate to the levels of the policy parameters in an open neighborhood around a given parameter setting. Since RnOffl = , we can rewrite (6) and (7) as
Now define .1 = (R~Rnom) , and the vector-valued function g(1,~3,A) by g 1 (I;fl,A)
Equilibrium functions R(fi,A) and Rnom(fi~A) exist in an open neighborhood around a given (/3 ,A ) so long as there exists an equilibrium vector
(1*;/3*,A*) and the derivative matrix D~g(1*;fi*,A*) is not singular.
Differentiation reveals that R (1±fi)-fl > 0 is sufficient to ensure that D~g(i*;fi*,A*) has a nonzero determinant.
Notice that
Alternatively, conditions (6) and (7) Clearly, open market purchases are not always the inflation-minimizing method of reducing the nominal rate; stated differently, we will not be able to obtain an analogue of Proposition 3 for nominal interest rate-pegging.
Notice, however, that in "perverse" examples reserve ratio adjustments that bring down the nominal rate also causes the real rate to increase. Thus in economies like these reserve ratio changes are of doubtful utility to policymakers whose ultimate objective is to ease real credit conditions. In this example the "thoroughly conventional" interval is short relative to the "perverse" interval. Both the existence and length of this interval are quite sensitive to changes in the specification, however. Increasing G to 0.0125 eliminates it entirely; reducing G to 0.0075 makes it longer than the perverse interval.
The existence of "thoroughly conventional" intervals suggests the possibility that a reduction in the nominal interest rate engineered via a change in the required reserve ratio can (1) 
VII. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to use a general equilibrium model of deficit finance to compare the relative magnitudes of the increases in the rate of inflation associated with attempts to reduce market interest rates through open market purchases, or reductions in the required reserve ratio.
We have identified conditions under which changes in both policy instruments have the "conventional" effects just described --conditions under which both open market purchases and reserve ratio reductions tend to drive down the real interest rate while driving up the inflation rate. We have shown that under these circumstances a given reduction in the real interest rate engineered through open market purchases always yields a smaller increase in the rate of inflation than an equal reduction brought about by a decrease in the required reserve ratio. Thus in our model an inflation-averse policymaker who desires to reduce the real interest rate should prefer an open market purchase over a reserve ratio reduction.
We have also succeeded, though somewhat less completely, in identifying conditions under which the nominal-rate analogue of the aforementioned "conventional wisdom" holds true. We have also shown that there are circumstances, consistent with the real-rate version of the conventional wisdom, under which the nominal-rate version holds for open market purchases but not reserve ratio changes --circumstances in which a reduction in the nominal interest rate engineered through a change in the required reserve ratio requires an increase in the ratio. Under these circumstances an inflation-averse who desires to reduce the nominal rate will prefer to increase the reserve ratio rather than carry out the open market purchase which generates the same rate. do arise the decline in the real interest rate caused by the reserve ratio reduction will be smaller than the decline caused by the open market purchase which produces the same nominal interst rate. Thus whenever reserve ratio changes are the least inflationary tool for no~~iinal rate-pegging, they are also the tool which which produces the least improvement in real credit conditions. 
